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INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR WRONGFUL
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND*
I. Introduction
Businesses are routinely subjected to a variety of claims by current and former
employees. For example, employees may sue their employers under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Title VII),'
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),2 the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA),3 the Equal Pay Act,4 section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of
1991,' and under certain circumstances, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as amended
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.6 Governmental employers may be the target of
section 1983' claims by aggrieved employees. All fifty states' and many local
governments have separate laws and ordinances prohibiting discrimination. Potential
plaintiffs also have a number of common law theories at their disposal. Former
employees may sue for blacklisting, wrongful discharge, constructive discharge,
retaliatory discharge, breach of express or implied contract, breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, defamation, and negligent or intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Indeed, employer liability is expanding at "a
bewildering pace."9
Traditionally, employers defended such suits with counsel of their choice, and
paid any settlements or judgments themselves." As litigation costs and actual and
* Associate, Armstrong Teasdale Schlafly & Davis, Kansas City, Missouri. B.S., 1980, Fort Hays
State University; M.Ed., 1981, University of Nebraska; J.D., 1988, University of Kansas. The author
teaches Insurance Law and Trial Advocacy at the University of Kansas School of Law.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. Id. §§ 12,101-12,213.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988)) applies to programs or activities receiving federal financial
assistance. See, e.g., Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 1995) (section 504 and ADA claims against
county transportation agency).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
8. David B. Ritter & Marcia E. Goodman, Insurance Coverage of Employee Claims Against
Employers, in TORT & INSURANCE PRACTICE SECTION, ABA, LITIGATING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT
CASE 49, 90 n.5 (1994).
9. Robert A. Machson & Joseph P. Monteleone, Insurance Coverage for Wrongful Employment
Practices Claims Under Various Liability Policies, 49 Bus. LAW. 689, 689 (1994).
10. See Ritter & Goodman, supra note 8, at 51.
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potential damage awards increase, however, employers increasingly look to their
insurers for the defense and indemnity of wrongful employment practices claims.
Employers may seek coverage under commercial general liability, directors' and
officers' liability, and workers' compensation and employer's liability policies. A
number of major insurers now write employment practices liability coverage, either
as a separate policy or as an endorsement to another policy. In short, insurance
coverage for wrongful employment practices is now a significant concern for
employers and insunrs alike.
II. Wrongful Employment Practices
The generic term "wrongful employment practices" used here is intentionally
broad. Breadth is essential, because current and former employees' claims are
limited only by their attorneys' imaginations, and even similar (if not identical)
claims may be differently labeled."
"Discrimination" claims are typically brought under Title VII, which prohibits
employers from "discriminatfing] against any individual with respect to his
compensation, term,;, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin."'2 Title VII applies to
private employers with at least fifteen employees in an industry affecting interstate
commerce. 3 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) primarily
implements and enforces Title VIIY
Discrimination actions generally fall into one of two categories: "disparate
treatment" and "disparate impact" cases.
"Disparate treatment" ... is the most easily understood type of discrimi-
nation. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin ....
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that
stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by
business necessity .... "
Title VII proscribes both the disparate treatment of employees and the disparate
impact of employers' policies. 6 "Disparate treatment is the most obvious form of
discrimination."' 7 Disparate impact discrimination, on the other hand, is the product
11. This article does not purport to address all potential plaintiffs' claims, or all wrongful
employment practices. The discussion of federal statutory claims or causes of action is not intended to
be exhaustive.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 200)e-2(a)(1) (1988).
13. Id. § 20ooe-2(b).
14. Machson & Monteleone, supra note 9, at 691.
15. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
16. Whether dispara.e impact theory applies to ADEA claims is an open question. See DiBiase v.
Smithkline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-34 (3d Cir. 1995).
17. Edwards v. Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995); EEOC v.
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of subtle practices. Discriminatory treatment claims hinge on proof of discrimina-
tory motive, while discriminatory impact claims do not." The real difference
between the two, then, is intent. Additionally, disparate treatment claims afford
plaintiffs greater compensatory damages and the opportunity to recover punitive
damages."
Absent direct evidence of discrimination, a Title VII or ADEA plaintiff must
make a prima facie showing of discrimination. Courts apply what is commonly
known as the McDonnell Douglas test, named for the Supreme Court's decision a
nnouncing it, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green." Depending on the particular
case, 21 a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she is a member of a protected class;
(2) she was qualified for the subject job, or was performing to the employer's
legitimate expectations; (3) she was terminated or rejected; and (4) she was replaced
by a person outside the protected class, a person outside the protected class was
treated more favorably, or the employer continued to seek applicants with her
qualifications after her rejection." An employer may rebut the presumption of
discrimination by producing evidence that it preferred someone other than the
plaintiff for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. If the defendant rebuts the
plaintiffs allegations, the plaintiffs primafacie showing is no longer relevant2  Of
course, the plaintiff can still prevail by demonstrating that the employer's stated
reasons for its actions are pretextual.l The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of
persuasion to show that the challenged employment decision or practice was the
result of illegal discrimination.
Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. June
19, 1995) (No. 94-1558).
18. Edwards, 49 F.3d at 1520-21; Francis W. Parker, 41 F.3d at 1076.
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 198la(a)(1) & (2) (1988).
20. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
21. The McDonnell Douglas framework is flexible and may be adapted to fit different situations.
Cherry v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 225,228 (7th Cir. 1995); LaFond v. General Physics Servs.
Corp., 50 F.3d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1995); Waldron v. SL Indus., 56 F.3d 491, 494 n.3 (3d Cir. 1995).
22. See Coutu v. Martin County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 47 F.3d 1068, 1073 (11th Cir. 1995);
Krenik v. County of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995); Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks
& Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Roper v. Peabody Coal Co., 47 F.3d 925, 926 (7th Cir.
1995).
23. Coutu, 47 F.3d at 1073; Krenik, 47 F.3d at 958.
24. Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 1995); Woodman v. Haemonetics
Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1091 (1st Cir. 1995); Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1379 (10th Cir.
1994); Turner v. AmSouth Bank, 36 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 1994).
25. EEOC v. Louisiana Office of Community Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1443 (5th Cir. 1995); Lidge-
Myrtil v. Deere & Co., 49 F.3d 1308, 1311 (8th Cir. 1995); Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724,
728 (3d Cir. 1995); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 944 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1104 (1995); Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325, 1329-30 (6th Cir. 1994); EEOC v. Ethan
Allen, Inc., 44 F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1994).
26. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993); see also Murray v. City of
Sapulpa, 45 F.3d 1417, 1421 (10th Cir. 1995); Cronin, 46 F.3d at 203; Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
38 F.3d 968, 971 (8th Cir. 1994); Lam v. University of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1564 (9th Cir. 1994).
19951
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The McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where a plaintiff presents direct
evidence of discrimination. 7 In the Title VII context, direct evidence includes any
document or statement showing a discriminatory motive on its face.' The ADEA
evidentiary analysis, including the shifting burden of proof, parallels that used in
Title VII cases."
Under the ADA, an individual has a "disability" if he has a mental or physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities, he has
a record of such an impairment, or he is regarded as having such an impairment."
In order to incur liability under the ADA, an employer must know of an employee's
claimed disability. An employer obviously cannot discriminate against an employee
"because of' a disabi1ity unless it knows of the disability. 1
A plaintiff makes a primafacie ADA case by establishing (1) that she is disabled
within the meaning of the Act; (2) that she can perform essential job functions, with
or without reasonable accommodations; and (3) that she was rejected or terminated
because of her disability. 2 Like Title VII and ADEA cases, ADA cases involve
shifting burdens. Once a plaintiff satisfies her initial three-part test, the burden then
shifts to the employer to show its inability to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff
without undue hardship. The plaintiff must then come forward with evidence
concerning her individual capabilities and suggestions for possible accommoda-
tions.3 The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion at all times.'
Sexual harassment claims were energized by the Senate Judiciary Committee's
confirmation hearings for Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas. In the year
following Justice Thomas's confirmation, sexual harassment claims reported to the
EEOC rose fifty percent. 5 Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination
prohibited by Title VII.
"Sexual harassment" generally refers to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.37 Quid pro
quo harassment occurs when submission to such conduct is an express or implied
condition for better workplace treatment, compensation, or promotion. Sexual
harassment need not include an economic quid pro quo. So-called "hostile
27. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1984); see also Johnson v. New York,
49 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1995).
28. Portis v. First Nat'l Bank, 34 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 1994).
29. Thomas v. IBM, 48 F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir. 1995).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
31. Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1995).
32. See White v. York. Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360-61 (10th Cir. 1995); Tyndall v. National Educ.
Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 212-13 (4th Cir. 1994).
33. White, 45 F.3d at 361; Mason v. Frank, 32 F.3d 315, 319 (8th Cir. 1994).
34. White, 45 F.3d at 361; DeLuca v. Winer Indus., 53 F.3d 793, 797-98 (7th Cir. 1995).
35. Machson & Mont.leone, supra note 9, at 693.
36. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); see also Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47
F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995).
37. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65.
38. See Cram v. Laxn;on & Sessions, Inc., 49 F.3d 466, 473 (8th Cir. 1995); Ellert v. University
of Tex., 52 F.3d 543, 545 (5th Cir. 1995); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 1994).
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environment" claims are also actionable. This latter form of harassment occurs
where the challenged conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with the subject's work performance, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive work environment.39 Isolated, innocuous or sporadic incidents of
offensive behavior generally will not support a finding of sexual harassment.'
The Supreme Court most recently examined sexual harassment in Harris v.
Forklift Systems," a hostile environment case. In Harris, the Court was asked to
determine whether a plaintiff must suffer serious psychological injury in order for
sexual harassment to be actionable.42 The court concluded that Title VII imposed
no such requirement. "So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived,
and is perceived as hostile or abusive . . . there is no need for it also to be
psychologically injurious."'43
Race discrimination victims have remedies beyond Title VII. "An employee's
right to employment free from racial discrimination is one of the most widely
recognized and protected civil rights."" Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, employees are
protected against "nongovernmental discrimination," as well as discrimination under
color of state law.45 Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.'
Section 1981 is broader than Title VII in some respects because it includes no
threshold number of employees for purposes of employer liability.47 Additionally,
section 1981 does not limit plaintiffs' potential recovery of compensatory and
39. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65.
40. Koelsch v. Beltone Elec. Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1995); West v. Philadelphia Elec.
Co., 45 F.3d 744, 755 (3d Cir. 1995); Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir. 1994). The
Seventh Circuit attempted to explain the fine line between potentially actionable harassment and
inactionable vulgarity in Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995):
On one side lie sexual assaults; other physical contact, whether amorous or hostile, for
which there is no consent express or implied; uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating
words or acts; obscene language or gestures; pornographic pictures .... On the other side
lies the occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish
workers . . . . It is not a bright line, obviously, this line between merely unpleasant
working environment.., and a hostile or deeply repugnant one ....
Id. at 430-31 (citations omitted).
41. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
42. Id. at 370.
43. Id. at 371 (citation omitted).
44. Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c) (1988).
46. Id. § 1981(a).
47. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510, 1515 n.3 (1994).
1995]
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punitive damages, and there is no requirement of administrative exhaustion.
However, employers, can violate section 1981 only by intentional discrimination.4
Plaintiffs who can establish that their employer deprived them of a constitutional
right while acting under color of state law may sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.!' For
example, public employees might allege that they were discharged or retaliated
against for exercising their First Amendment right to free speech.' Section 1983
provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any state or territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or amenities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law .... 5'
In sum, section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but provides a remedy for
the violation of rights created by federal law. 2 Mere negligence will not support
a section 1983 claim;53 rather, the defendant must act deliberately or recklessly.'
Additionally, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a viable basis for section
1983 liability.55
Wrongful discharge claims are based on an at-will employee's termination or
layoff for improper purposes. Wrongful discharge plaintiffs may allege they were
fired because of thetir age, sex, or race, or because they suffer some disability.
Plaintiffs also routinely allege they were fired for reasons contrary to public policy,
such as refusing to commit a crime directed by their employers, reporting violations
of the law, or asserting legal rights.' In order to succeed on a wrongful discharge
48. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982); see also National
Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 40 F.3d 698, 714 (5th Cir. 1994);
Grooms v. Wiregrass Elec. Coop., 877 F. Supp. 602, 607 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
49. See Broman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995); Tatro v. Kervin, 41
F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 19941.
50. See, e.g., Barnard v. Jackson County, Mo., 43 F.3d 1218 (8th Cir. 1995); Blackburn v. Marshall
City, 42 F.3d 925 (5th Cir. 1995); Feldman v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 823 (3d Cir. 1994).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
52. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985).
53. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1985).
54. Romero v. Fay, 4.5 F.3d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1995); Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1301-
02 (5th Cir. 1995).
55. Green v. Bauvi, 46 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1995); Randle v. Parker, 48 F.3d 301, 303 (8th Cir.
1995).
56. See, e.g., Sunshine Inv. v. Brooks, 642 So. 2d 408, 410-11 (Ala. 1994); Leggett v. Centro, Inc.,
887 S.W.2d 523, 524-25 (Ark. 1994); Leibert v. Transworld Sys., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 70-72 (Ct. App.
1995); Herman v. Western Fin. Corp., 869 P.2d 696, 703-05 (Kan. 1994); Mountain Clay, Inc. v.
Commission on Human Rights, 830 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992); McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix
Co., 626 So. 2d 603, 604-07 (Miss. 1993); Lay v. St. Louis Helicopter Airways, 869 S.W.2d 173, 176-77
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Taylor v. Cache Creek Nursing Ctrs., 891 P.2d 607 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994);
Anderson v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines, 886 P.2d 1068 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Reynolds v. Ozark Motor
Lines, 887 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tenn. 1994); Gallipo v. City of Rutland, 656 A.2d 635 (Vt. 1994); Roberts
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claim under the "public policy" exception to the at-will employment doctrine, the
action must vindicate a broad public interest, and not merely advance the plaintiffs
personal or proprietary interests.' A constructive discharge occurs where the
employer makes the employee's working conditions intolerable, essentially forcing
him to quit 8 The constructive discharge standard is an objective one, with the
proper focus being on the working conditions imposed 9
III. Insurance Fundamentals
Employers sued for their alleged wrongful employment practices may look for
coverage under general liability, directors' and officers' liability, errors and
omissions, or workers' compensation and employer's liability insurance policies.
A. Commercial General Liability Insurance
Commercial general liability (CGL) insurance is the primary form of liability
coverage for most businesses. A standard CGL policy covers claims alleging bodily
injury or property damage caused by an occurrence. Standard policies define
"bodily injury" to include "bodily injury, sickness or disease."'  As a rule,
emotional distress alone does not constitute bodily injury." "Bodily injury is a
v. Adkins, 444 S.E.2d 725 (V. Va. 1994).
57. See City of Green Forest v. Morse, 873 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Ark. 1994); Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc.,
864 P.2d 88, 94-95 (Cal. 1993).
58. Beard v. Baum, 796 P.2d 1344, 1349-50 (Alaska 1990); Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876
P.2d 1022, 1030-32 (Cal. 1994); Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 362 (D.C. 1993);
Vagts v. Perry Drug Stores, 516 N.W.2d 102, 105 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Manning v. City of Hazel
Park, 509 N.W.2d 874, 880 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), appeal dismissed, 521 N.W.2d 610 (Minn. 1994);
Missouri Div. of Employment Sec. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n of Mo., 739 S.W.2d 747, 749
(Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Sullivan v. Sisters of Charity of Providence of Mont., 885 P.2d 488, 494-95 (Mont.
1994); Martin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 899 P.2d 551, 553 (Nev. 1995); Fischer v. KPMG Peat
Marwick, 607 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311 (App. Div. 1994); Kroen v. Bedway Sec. Agency, 633 A.2d 628, 633
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Slack v. Kanawha County Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 423 S.E.2d 547, 558
(W. Va. 1992).
59. See Towle v. Flexel Corp., 867 F. Supp. 954, 958-59 (D. Kan. 1994); Cameron v. Beard, 864
P.2d 538, 547 (Alaska 1993); Gibson v. Aro Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 888 (Ct. App. 1995); Seery
v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., 554 A.2d 757, 761 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989); Motley v. Illinois Human Rights
Comm'n, 636 N.E.2d 100, 104-05 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); GTE Prods. Corp. v. Stewart, 653 N.E.2d 161,
168-69 (Mass. 1995); Soentgen v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, 467 N.W.2d 73, 83 (N.D. 1991); Schwartz
v. Comcorp, Inc., 633 N.E.2d 551, 554 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993), appeal dismissed, 631 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio
1994); Hammond v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 821 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
60. SUSAN J. MILLER & PInuP LEFEBVRE, 1 MILLER'S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED
409 (1991).
61. Knapp v. Eagle Property Management Corp., 54 F.3d 1272,1284-85 (7th Cir. 1995) (interpreting
Wisconsin law); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Holloway, 17 F.3d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1994) (interpreting Texas
law); McLaughlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 569 (Ct. App. 1994); National
Casualty Co. v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 741, 746-47 (Colo. 1992); University of Ill. v.
Continental Casualty Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1353 (I11. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 606 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill.
1992); Wayne Township Bd. of Sch. Comrm'rs v. Indiana Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 1205, 1210-11 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1995); McNeill v. Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 793,795 (Mass. 1995); State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Basham, 520 N.W.2d 713,715 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Mellow v. Medical
19951
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narrow term and encompasses only physical injuries to the body and the conse-
quences thereof."' 2 A few states have abandoned the physical injury requirement,
affording coverage for emotional distress in the absence of physical injuries or
symptoms.' Even in those states strictly adhering to the physical injury require-
ment for coverage, physical manifestations of emotional distress trigger coverage
for bodily injury.' "Property damage" means "physical injury to or destruction of
tangible property," or "loss of use of tangible property which has not been
physically injured or destroyed" occurring during the policy period.'
The alleged bodily injury or property damage at issue must be caused by an
"occurrence." An occurrence is generally defined as "an accident, or event including
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury...
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."' By virtue of
this definition, CGL policies do not insure against insureds' intentional acts. An
intentional act is not an accident and it therefore cannot be an "occurrence. '
Moreover, standard CGL policies expressly and specifically provide that they do not
apply to bodily injury or property damage "expected or intended" from the insured's
standpoint.' This latter provision is simply an intentional acts exclusion.
Some CGL policies, and thos6 CGL policies with a standard broad form
endorsement, protect insureds against "personal injury" claims. Standard CGL
policies define personal injury as follows:
"Personal Injury" means injury arising out of one or more of the folio
wing offenses committed during the policy period:
(1) false arrest, detention, imprisonment, or malicious prosecu-
tion;
(2) wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of
private occupancy;
(3) a publication or utterance
(a) of a libel or slander or other defamatory or disparaging
material, or
Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 567 A.2d 367, 368 (R.I. 1989); Northwest Farm Bureau Ins. Co.
v. Roberts, 765 P.2d 328, 330 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
62. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Diamant, 518 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (Mass. 1988).
63. See, e.g., First Ina. Co. of Haw. v. Lawrence, 881 P.2d 489, 492-94 (Haw. 1994); Lavanant v.
General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 595 N.E.2d 819, 822-23 (N.Y. 1992); State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co.
v. Ramsey, 374 S.E.2d 896, 896 (S.C. 1988).
64. See, e.g., Garvis v. Employers Mut. Casualty Co., 497 N.W.2d 254,257 (Minn. 1993); Voorhees
v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1262 (N.J. 1992).
65. MILLER & LEFEBVRE, supra note 60, at 409.
66. See, e.g., Great L.-kes Chem. Corp. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 638 N.E.2d 847, 853
(Ind. Ct. App. 1994); SmaTtfoods, Inc. v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Co., 618 N.E.2d 1365, 1367
(Mass. App. Ct. 1993); SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Minn. 1995);
Sanborn Plastics Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 616 N.E.2d 988, 993 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993);
Union Pac. Resources Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 894 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994);
see also MILLER & LEFEBVRF, supra note 60, at 409.
67. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. v. Kienenberger, 847 P.2d 1360, 1361 (Mont. 1993).
68. MILLER & LEFEBVRE, supra note 60, at 434.2.
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(b) in violation of an individual's right of privacy;
except publications or utterances in the course of or related to advertis-
ing, broadcasting, publishing or telecasting activities conducted by or on
behalf of the named insured shall not be deemed personal injury.'
Employees' allegations of defamation or the invasion of their privacy rights may
constitute covered personal injury. However, the standard broad form personal
injury endorsement excludes coverage for personal injury "arising out of the willful
violation of a penal statute or ordinance committed by or with the knowledge or
consent of the insured."7 Defamatory statements made with knowledge of their
falsity are also excluded.71
The general liability policy at issue in City of Boise v. Planet Insurance Co.'
defined "personal injury" to include "[b]odily injury, sickness, disease, disability,
hock, fright, mental anguish, and mental injury, including death at any time [as a
result]."' An assistant fire chief, Patrick Dunn, sued the city, alleging that he was
wrongfully demoted. He was awarded ajudgment of more than $288,000, including
$46,608 for emotional distress. The city's insurer denied coverage.74
The Supreme Court of Idaho observed that Dunn's emotional distress attributable
to his demotion constituted "personal injury" as defined in the city's policy.
Specifically, emotional distress fell within "mental anguish, and mental injury."'75
After holding that an employee personal injury exclusion did not exclude
coverage,76 the City of Boise court next addressed whether Dunn's demotion was
an "occurrence." Because the fire chief who demoted Dunn did not intend to cause
his emotional distress, the demotion was an "occurrence." The insurer was therefore
obligated to pay the judgment.'
Liability insurers owe their insureds two express contractual duties: a duty to
defend and a duty to indemnify.78 The insurer's duty to defend arises upon the
insured's tender," and it is much broader than the duty to indemnify." Any
69. Id. at 436.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 878 P.2d 750 (Idaho 1994).
73. Id. at 752.
74. Id. at 753.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 753-55.
77. Id. at 756-57.
78. See ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw 561-62 (1987).
79. Oscar W. Larson Co. v. United Capitol Ins. Co., 845 F. Supp. 458, 460 (W.D. Mich. 1993);
Purvis v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 877 P.2d 827, 830 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Montrose Chem.
Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 1993); Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Clarendon
Ins. Co., 642 N.E.2d 790, 793 (Ili. App. Ct. 1994); Pedro Cos. v. Sentry Ins., 518 N.W.2d 49, 51 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1994).
80. Audubon Ins. Co. v. Terry Rd. Wine & Liquor, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1243, 1247 (S.D. Miss.
1995); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. National Bank for Coops., 849 F. Supp. 1347, 1363 (N.D. Cal. 1994);
Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1089 (Colo. 1991); Irvine v. Prudential
Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 630 So. 2d 579, 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Waitzman v. Classic Syn-
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doubts as to whether a defense is owed are always resolved in the insured's favor."
Even so, an insurer has no duty to defend when there is no potential for coverage
under any theory.'
Generally, whether a defense is owed is determined by comparing the petition or
complaint with the policy.' Some jurisdictions have strayed from the "eight
comers" rule, requiring the insurer to look beyond the pleadings to determine
dicate, 648 N.E.2d 104, 108 (II. App. Ct. 1995); Essex Ins. Co. v. Fieldhouse, Inc., 506 N.W.2d 772,
775 (Iowa 1993); Dennis v. Finish Line, Inc., 636 So. 2d 944, 946 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 644 So.
2d 636 (La. 1994); State NMut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d 35, 36 (Me. 1991); 26 Adar N.B. Corp. v.
Stewart Title Ins. Co., 610 N.Y.S.2d 7, 8 (App. Div. 1994); Gebrayel v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 888
P.2d 83, 86 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 892 P.2d 1024 (Or. 1995); Carstensen v. Chrisland Corp., 442
S.E.2d 660, 666 (Va. 1994); Elliott v. Donahue, 485 N.W.2d 403, 407 (Wis. 1992).
81. Legarra v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 105 (Ct. App. 1995); Washington v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 629 A.2d 24, 26 (D.C. 1993); Chantel Assocs. v. Mount Vernon Fire
Ins. Co., 656 A.2d 779,786 (Md. 1995); SCA Servs. v. Transportation Ins. Co., 646 N.E.2d 394,396-97
(Mass. 1995); American Bumper & Mfg. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 523 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1994); Atlantic Employers Ins. Co. v. Chartwell Manor Sch., 655 A.2d 954, 958 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1995); Hart Constr. Co. v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 384,389 (N.D. 1994);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Russo, 641 A.2d 1304, 1306 (R.I. 1994); North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kneen, 484
N.W.2d 908, 912 (S.D. IS92); Clemons v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 879 S.W.2d 385, 392 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1994); School Dist. of Shorewood v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 488 N.W.2d 82, 87 (Wis. 1992).
82. La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 884 P.2d 1048, 1057-59 (Cal.
1994); MGM, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 77, 79-80 (Kan. 1993); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roy,
653 So. 2d 1327, 1333 (La Ct. App. 1995); Columbia Nat'l Ins. v. Pacesetter Homes, Inc., 532 N.W.2d
1, 10 (Neb. 1995); see, e.g., Thompson v. West Am. Ins. Co., 839 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992);
American Casualty Co. v. Corum, 885 P.2d 726 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
83. Bernstein v. North E. Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 1456, 1457 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (applying District of
Columbia law); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Lee Anesthesia, 641 So. 2d 247, 249 (Ala. 1994); Sauer v. Home
Indem. Co., 841 P.2d 176,180-81 (Alaska 1992); Tri-State Ins. Co. v. Sing, 850 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1993); Gerrity Co. v. CIGNA Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 606, 607 (Colo. Ct. App.
1993); Schwartz v. Stevenson, 657 A.2d 244,246 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995); Smith v. General Accident Ins.
Co. of Am., 641 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1994); Hames Contracting, Inc. v. Georgia Ins. Co.,
440 S.E.2d 738, 739 (Ga. CL App. 1994); Hawaiian Holiday Macadamia Nut Co. v. Industrial Indem.
Co., 872 P.2d 230, 233 (Haw. 1994); City of Idaho Falls v. Home Indem. Co., 888 P.2d 383, 387 (Idaho
1995); Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 641 N.E.2d 395, 398 (I11. 1994); Ottumwa Hous. Auth.
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 726 (Iowa 1993); James Graham Brown Found.
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Tns. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 279 (Ky. 1991); Steptore v. Masco Constr. Co., 643
So. 2d 1213, 1218 (La. 1994); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 658 A.2d 1081, 1082 (Me.
1995); Liquor Liab. Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Hermitage Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 964, 967 (Mass, 1995);
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994);
Green Mountain Ins. Co. v. Foreman, 641 A.2d 230,232 (N.H. 1994); Lopez v. New Mexico Pub. Sch.
Ins. Auth., 870 P.2d 745, 747 (N.M. 1994); Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 446 S.E.2d 877, 878
(N.C. Ct. App. 1994); Ledford v. Gutoski, 877 P.2d 80, 82 (Or. 1994); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Roe, 650 A.2d 94, 98-99 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Piedmont Petroleum Corp.,
444 S.E.2d 532, 533 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994); City of Ft. Pierre v. United Fire & Casualty Co., 463 N.W.2d
845, 847 (S.D. 1990); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Torpoco, 879 S.W.2d 831, 834-35 (Tenn.
1994); Crum & Forster, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 887 S.W.2d 103, 121 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); City of
Burlington v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 655 A.2d 719, 721 (Vt. 1994); Brenner v. Lawyers Title Ins.
Corp., 397 S.E.2d 100, 102 (Va. 1990); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roffe, Inc., 872 P.2d 536, 538 (Wash.
CL App. 1994); City of Edgerton v. General Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d 463, 470 (Wis. 1994); Reisig v.
Union Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Wyo. 1994).
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whether it owes the insured a defense." These jurisdictions properly view the eight
corners rule as an inclusionary standard.' In other words, every petition or
complaint alleging a covered cause of action gives rise to a duty to defend. The
eight comers rule is not a valid exclusionary standard; that is, the plaintiffs pleaded
allegations should not be dispositive of the insurer's duty to defend. There are at
least two good arguments for abandoning the eight comers rule. First, an insured
should not be penalized for a plaintiffs vague or inartful pleading.' This is
especially true in those jurisdictions allowing liberal notice pleading. Second, the
true focus should be on the four comers of the policy. To hold otherwise is to allow
an insurer to turn the plaintiffs complaint or petition into a coverage fortress.
While a standard liability policy speaks in terms of the insurer's right and duty
to defend a "suit" against the insured, a "suit" may be something other than a
judicial proceeding. As has been frequently litigated with respect to environmental
claims, threatened administrative proceedings may trigger an insurer's duty to
defend.' This may be significant in the wrongful employment practices context,
since plaintiffs may be required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing
suit,9 or they may simply elect to pursue administrative remedies. Administrative
remediation of alleged wrongful employment practices may trigger an insurer's duty
to defend
An insurer's duty to indemnify its insured, unlike its duty to defend, is linked
solely to coverage under the policy at issue. The insurer's duty to indemnify is not
implicated until the insured incurs liability for the underlying claim.9' The timing
of an insurer's duty to indemnify is made clear by the standard policy language
84. See American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Allied-Sysco Food Serv., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 112 (Ct.
App. 1993); Seymour Mfg. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 648 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995); Spivey v. Safeco Ins. Co., 865 P.2d 182, 188 (Kan. 1993); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Cochran,
651 A.2d 859, 863-66 (Md. 1995); Haarstad v. Graft, 517 N.W.2d 582, 584-85 (Minn. 1994); Standard
Artificial Limb v. Allianz Ins. Co., 895 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Union Ins. Co. v. Land
& Sky, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 773, 776 (Neb. 1995); SL Indus. v. American Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 607
A.2d 1266, 1272 (N.J. 1992); Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co., 575 N.E.2d 90, 93-94 (N.Y.
1991); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.E.2d 796, 798-99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Deseret
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 714 P.2d 1143, 1147 (Utah 1986).
85. JERRY, supra note 78, at 564.
86. Cochran, 651 A.2d at 865-66.
87. Fitzpatrick, 575 N.E.2d at 93-94.
88. See, e.g., Hutchinson Oil Co. v. Federated Serv. Ins. Co., 851 F. Supp. 1456, 1552 (D. Wyo.
1994); Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bronson Plating Co., 519 N.W.2d 864, 868-72 (Mich. 1994);
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co., 870 P.2d 260, 266 (Or. Ct.
App.), modified, 875 P.2d 537 (1994).
89. For example, Title VII requires administrative exhaustion. See Davis v. North Carolina Dep't
of Corrections, 48 F.3d 134, 137 (4th Cir. 1995). The exhaustion requirement is important, because it
enables the EEOC to obtain employers' voluntary compliance and promote conciliation. See Williams
v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1994).
90. See, e.g., Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 5 v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 419 N.E.2d 1257 (I11. App.
Ct. 1981).
91. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1221 (Ill. 1992); Mount
Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 638 A.2d 1196, 1201 (Md. 1994).
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under which the insurer promises to "pay on behalf of the insured all such sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages."' To protect
insureds' interests in the interim, and to generally shield insureds from financial
calamity in the form of an excess judgment, courts imply a duty on insurers' part
to settle claims within policy limits for their insureds' benefit.' The implied duty
to settle supplements insurers' duty to indemnify.
B. Directors' and Officers' Liability Policies
Unlike CGL policies, directors' and officers' (D & 0) liability policies do not
follow a standard form and therefore vary significantly between insurers." While
generalizations are thus riskier, most D & 0 policies specifically exclude all
bodily injury and pr-operty damage claims, and many personal injury claims. A
typical D & 0 policy exclusion provides that the insurer shall not be liable:
[Flor bodily i'ajury, sickness, disease, death or emotional distress of
any person, or damage to or destruction of any tangible property,
including the loss of use thereof, or for injury from oral or written
publication of a libel or slander or of other defamatory or disparaging
material or of material that violates a person's right of privacy. 9
Accordingly, aggrieved employees or former employees who attempt to plead into
coverage on bodily injury, property damage or personal injury theories will find
the exercise futile.
D & 0 policies also include an "insured vs. insured exclusion," providing that
the insurer shall not be liable for any claim against a director or officer made by
another director or officer, or by the corporation.96 Designed to prevent friendly
92. HANOVER INSURANCE, HANDBUSiNESS BUSINESSOWNERS INSURANCE PoLcY 17 (1989) (on file
with author).
93. Magnum Foods, nc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 36 F.3d 1491, 1504 (10th Cir. 1994) (Oklahoma
law); Carier Express, Inc v. Home Indem. Co., 860 F. Supp. 1465, 1478-79 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Jordan v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 843 F. Supp. 164, 171 (S.D. Miss. 1993); Taylor v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 893 P.2d 39, 45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Camelot by the Bay Condominium Owners' Ass'n
v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 354, 360 (Ct. App. 1994); Flickinger v. Ninth Dist. Prod. Credit
Ass'n, 824 P.2d 19, 24 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Brookins v. Goodson, 640 So. 2d 110, 113 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994); Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt, 416 S.E.2d 274, 276 (Ga. 1992); Levier v. Koppenheffer, 879
P.2d 40, 46-47 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994); Smith v. Audubon Ins. Co., 656 So. 2d 11, 15 (La. Ct. App. 1995);
Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 628 N.E.2d 14, 16-17 (Mass. 1994); State ex rel.
Shelton v. Mummert, 879 S.W.2d 525,529 (Mo. 1994); Venetsanos v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker, 638 A.2d
1333, 1340 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994); Continental Casualty Co. v. Kinsey, 513 N.W.2d 66, 69
(N.D. 1994); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Said, 590 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ohio 1992); American Physicians
Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 848 (Tex. 1994); Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840
P.2d 130, 138 (Utah CL App.), cert. denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1992); Shrader v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 882 P.2d 813, 826 (Wyo. 1994).
94. Machson & Monteleone, supra note 9, at 70.
95. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS. Co. oF PITTSBURGH, PA., DIRECrORS AND OFFICERS INSURANCE
AND COMPANY REIMBURSEMENT POLICY 3 (1988) (on file with the author).
96. Davis J. Howard, The "Insured vs. Insured" Exclusion and the Concept of Dual Capacity, 17
INS. LrG. REP. 95, 95 (1995).
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or collusive suits,' the "insured vs. insured" exclusion may affect wrongful
employment practices litigation.
In Foster v. Kentucky Housing Corporation," the defendant's former executive
director, Robert Martinez, sued the KHC's officers and directors when they fired
him in alleged violation of his employment contract. The KHC's insurer, Lloyd's,
denied coverage. Lloyd's relied on the "insured vs. insured" exclusion in the KHC
policy. The exclusion provided:
Underwriters shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss in
connection with any Claim made against the Directors or Officers, or
the Organization by or on behalf of the Organization, or any affiliate of
the Organization, or any other Director or Officer except to the extent
that such claim is in the form of a crossclaim, third party claim or
otherwise for contribution or indemnity which is part of the terms of
this policy; provided, however, that this exclusion shall not apply to any
claim brought by or on behalf of any employee of, or any volunteer
working for the Organization where such employee or volunteer is not
also a Director or Officer of the Organization.
The policy defined "Directors and Officers" as directors or officers, KHC employees
or staff members, and volunteers working for the KH-C."
The district court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment. Martinez
clearly fell within the policy definition of "Directors and Officers," thus giving
effect to the "insured vs. insured" exclusion.' The court rejected the defendants'
argument that the exclusion only applied to friendly or collusive suits. The court
found "no ambiguity in the exclusion ... and decline[d] to rewrite the insurance
contract to enlarge the risk of the insurer.""'
The Conklin Co. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co."3 court concluded that
the exclusion did not apply to a wrongful discharge suit by a former officer. The
Conklin court articulated three reasons for its decision. First, the "insured vs.
insured" exclusion is intended to bar friendly or collusive suits in which a
corporation sues its directors or officers to obtain coverage benefits. That is not the
situation in a wrongful discharge suit, which is clearly adversarial, rather than
collusive or friendly."O Second, the plaintiff was suing simply as a wronged
employee and not in his capacity as an officer. Since he was merely asserting a
personal claim, he could not be termed an "insured" within the meaning of the
97. Slaughter v. American Casualty Co., 842 F. Supp. 371, 374 (E.D. Ark. 1993), rev'd on other
grounds, 37 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 1994); Howard, supra note 96, at 95.
98. 850 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Ky. 1994).
99. Id. at 559.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 561.
102. Id.
103. Civ. No. 4-86-860, 1987 WL 108957 (D. Minn. Jan. 28, 1987).
104. Id. at *2.
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exclusion.'" Third, the court found the exclusion to be ambiguous, thus requiring
its construction against the insurer."
C. Workers' Compensation and Employer's Liability Policies
Workers' compensation insurance and employer's liability coverage are provided
in a single policy. Workers' compensation coverage is typically designated as
Coverage A or Part One, while employer's liability coverage is Coverage B or Part
Two. Both coverages insure against employees' bodily injury caused or aggravated
by employment conditions.
Employer's liability coverage is a "gap filler." It covers employers for the few
claims of employees that are not preempted by the exclusive remedy provisions of
state workers' compensation laws."° If a particular claim is covered by workers'
compensation, there is no coverage under the employer's liability section of the
policy."o Employeres liability insurance affords so-called "gap filler" coverage'
because it covers caims falling in the "gap" between workers' compensation and
general liability coverages. Standard CGL policies exclude bodily injury to "[a]n
employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of employment by the
insured."'" The operation of this exclusion is best exemplified by McLeod v.
Tecorp International, Ltd.," in which the Supreme Court of Oregon held that it
barred coverage for a former employee's wrongful discharge claim."'
IV. Litigating Coverage for Wrongful Employment Practices
Insurers aggressively resist attempts to impose coverage for wrongful employment
practices, and they are often successful for obvious reasons. For example, a Title
VII disparate treatment plaintiff must establish that her employer acted with
discriminatory intent." 2 Liability policies do not cover intentional acts; intentional
acts are not within the meaning of "occurrence" and liability policies contain an
intentional acts exclusion. Thus, a Title VII disparate treatment claim standing alone
is insufficient to trigger coverage."' The same reasoning holds true for indepen-
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 884 P.2d 1048, 1056 (Cal. 1994).
108. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259, 264 (Ct. App. 1994); see, e.g.,
Cowen v. Mercury Fin. Co., 607 So. 2d 1067, 1068-69 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Truck Ins. Exch. v.
Vassholz, 839 S.W.2d 22, 23-24 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. v. Marca, 788 P.2d
490, 491-92 (Or. Ct: App. 1990).
109. MILLER & LEFEBVRE, supra note 60, at 434.2; see, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
National Convenience &ores, 891 S.W.2d 20, 21-22 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
110. 865 P.2d 1283 (Or. 1993).
111. Id. at 1287-88; accord Loyola Marymount Univ. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 271 Cal.
Rptr. 528, 530-31 (Ct. App. 1990); Board of Educ. of E. Syracuse-Minoa Central Sch. Dist. v.
Continental Ins. Co., 604 N.Y.S.2d 399, 400 (App. Div. 1993) (retaliatory discharge and sexual
harassment claims).
112. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Jack;on County Hosp. v. Alabama Hosp. Assn Trust, 619 So. 2d 1369, 1372 (Ala.
1993).
[Vol. 48:1
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol48/iss1/2
WRONGFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
dent sexual harassmen" 4 and age discrimination claims."5 An employee's
wrongful discharge is an intentional act precluding coverage."6 Coverage questions
are not always so easily resolved, however.
A. Coverage Under Various Liability Policies
Regardless of whether the policy at issue is a CGL policy or a D & 0 policy, the
coverage issues are similar. Policy language is always the key determinant.
1. Intentional Acts
Most wrongful employment practices coverage litigation centers on the insured's
intent. Rideout v. Crum & Forster Commercial Insurance"7 is an illustrative case.
The Rideout plaintiffs filed complaints with a state agency alleging that their
employer, Hub Manufacturing, discriminated against them by denying them equal
pay, the opportunity to work overtime, and promotions based on their sex. Shortly
thereafter, Hub laid off the plaintiffs as part of a general short-term layoff. When
Hub did not recall them, the plaintiffs amended their administrative complaints to
add retaliatory discharge claims."8 An administrative hearing officer concluded
that Hub unlawfully discriminated and retaliated against the plaintiffs, and awarded
them each damages exceeding $45,000."' When Hub went out of business, thus
defaulting on the administrative awards, the plaintiffs attempted to garnish Hub's
CGL insurers.
The insurers argued that there was no coverage because Hub's discriminatory acts
did not constitute an "occurrence." The insurers reasoned that Hub expected or
intended to deprive the plaintiffs of their wages, and to cause them emotional
distress. The Rideout court embraced the insurers' arguments.
Because Hub, in discriminating against the plaintiffs because of their
sex and retaliating against them because of their complaints, intended
or was substantially certain that the plaintiffs would suffer the type of
harm they did suffer, the plaintiffs' claims do not constitute an
"occurrence" under the policies in question.''
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Hub "negligently or recklessly
discriminated against them."'" The plaintiffs' argument ignored the administrative
114. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Cos. v. Sky, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 249, 252-54 (W.D. Ark.
1992); Sena v. Travelers Ins. Co., 801 F. Supp. 471,473-76 (D.N.M. 1992); State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Compupay, Inc., 654 So. 2d 944, 946-47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
115. See, e.g., Kline v. Kemper Group, 826 F. Supp. 123, 128-30 (M.D. Pa. 1993), affd, 22 F.3d
301 (3d Cir. 1994); Sage Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 480 N.W.2d 695, 698 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
116. See, e.g., Jackson County Hosp. v. Alabama Hosp. Ass'n Trust, 652 So. 2d 233, 235-36 (Ala.
1994); City of Muncie v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 564 N.E.2d 979, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
117. 633 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. 1994).
118. Id. at 377.
119. Id. at 377-78.
120. Id. at 378-79.
121. Id. at 380.
122. Id. at 379.
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hearing officer's finding that Hub intentionally discriminated against them.1'2 The
Rideout court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that even if Hub intentionally
discriminated against them, the company did not intend the resulting harm. The
court agreed with the trial judge's conclusion that "Hub either intended or was
substantially certain" that oppressing and retaliating against the plaintiffs as it did
would cause them emotional harm."U
The Supreme Court of Illinois reached a different result in Dixon Distributing Co.
v. Hanover Insurance Co." Dixon is a wrongful employment practices potpourri,
involving retaliatory discharge analysis, personal injury coverage, and public policy
argument.
The Dixon plaintiff alleged that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a
workers' compensation claim. The employer's commercial umbrella policy with
International Insurance Co. provided personal injury coverage. The International
policy defined "occurrence" as ."an offense which results in Personal Injury, other
than an offense committed with actual malice or the willful violation of a penal
statute or ordinance committed by or with the knowledge or consent of the
insured.""' The policy did not define "actual malice."
The plaintiff pleaded in his complaint that his termination was intentional, willful
and wrongful. International contended that these allegations were the equivalent of
actual malice so that the plaintiffs claim did not constitute an "occurrence."'1 The
insurer stood on its position when the plaintiff amended his complaint to allege that
his termination was "'intentional and in retaliation of and solely for the exercise of
[his] rights under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act.""' The court found
flaws in International's reasoning.
An act can be done intentionally without being ... done with actual
malice. Moreover, included in the [policy] definition of personal injury
are acts that contain an element of intent. Were we to equate intentional
conduct with actual malice, coverage for certain intentional conduct
would be provided under the definition of personal injury and then be
taken away under the definition of occurrence. This would render the
definition of personal injury superfluous and would create an ambiguity
where none exists . . . . [C]ourts will not distort the language of a
policy to create an ambiguity where none exists ....
Likewise, the allegation that [plaintiffs] termination was in retaliation
for filing workers' compensation claims cannot be construed to mean
actual malice. An essential predicate of a claim for retaliatory discharge
is an allegation that the employer's conduct be in retaliation for the
employee's activities. The retaliatory nature of the discharge, in this
123. Id.
124. Id. at 380.
125. 641 N.E.2d 395 (II. 1994).
126. Id. at 398 (emphasis added).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 399.
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context, does not mean that the discharge was committed with actual
malice, but merely that the discharge was causally related to the filing
of the workers' compensation claim .... Since the allegations in the
amended complaint cannot be construed to mean actual malice, they do
not fall beyond the scope of the policy's coverage."9
International additionally argued that coverage for the plaintiffs retaliatory
discharge claim would violate public policy. It argued that "such coverage is against
public policy because it insures against intentional misconduct."'" The Dixon
court rejected this argument, as well.'
The court noted the general rule that an insurance policy indemnifying an insured
for damages resulting from its own intentional misconduct is void as against public
policy.' However, there was no Illinois case law, statutory authority, or legisla-
tive directive to support International's public policy argument. In the absence of
clearly articulated reasoning or authority, the Dixon court declined to adopt a policy
against insuring for damages resulting from intentional misconduct on the facts
presented.'
The Supreme Court of Iowa relied on the "reasonable expectations doctrine" to
find coverage in Clark-Peterson Co. v. Independent Insurance Associates, Ltd."
In the underlying action, plaintiff Neil Brown obtained a substantial judgment
against Clark-Peterson on a wrongful termination theory. Brown successfully
alleged that Clark-Peterson discriminated against him because he was an alcohol-
ic1
3 5
Clark-Peterson was insured by Cincinnati Insurance Co. under a contractor's
umbrella liability policy. The policy afforded personal injury coverage, and
"personal injury" was defined to include discrimination or humiliation." s In order
to qualify as an "occurrence" under the policy, the subject act or event had to
"unexpectedly or unintentionally" result in personal injury.'37 Finally, the policy
contained a discrimination exclusion, providing that the policy did not apply to
personal injury liability "arising out of discrimination including fines or penalties
imposed by law.., committed by you or at your direction."'
38
When Cincinnati would not indemnify Clark-Peterson for Brown's judgment, the
insured filed a declaratory judgment action. The trial court ruled that the policy did
not cover Brown's claim because Clark-Peterson intentionally discriminated against
him. The trial court nevertheless held that Clark-Peterson was covered by virtue of
129. Id. (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 401.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 492 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 1992).
135. Id. at 676.
136. Id. at 676 n.3.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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the reasonable expectations doctrine. The Supreme Court of Iowa agreed with the
trial court on both points.'39
The Clark-Peterson court reasoned that the discrimination exclusion gutted the
personal injury coverage afforded when discrimination was included in the definition
of "occurrence."'" The court stated that "[t]o deny discrimination coverage in the
present case would be to withdraw with the policy's left hand what is given with the
right."'' The court succinctly dismissed the insurer's argument that the discrimina-
tion exclusion did nDt eviscerate the personal injury coverage because the policy still
covered disparate impact claims, thus barring application of the reasonable
expectations doctrine. Quite simply, Brown's case was not based on disparate
impact.""
Jostens, Inc. v. Northfield Insurance Co.' is among the most recent reasonable
expectations/illusory coverage cases involving wrongful employment practices. In
Jostens, the EEOC filed gender and age discrimination cases against Jostens
Learning Corporation. Jostens ultimately entered into a conciliation agreement with
the EEOC, but not before incurring attorneys' fees and costs exceeding
$300,000.'"
Jostens was insured under an umbrella liability policy issued by Northfield
Insurance Co. The Northfield policy covered both bodily injury and personal injury
claims, and included discrimination within the definition of personal injury. The
policy excluded coverage for discrimination (1) arising out of statutory violations;
(2) committed by or with the insured's knowledge or consent; (3) against
employment applicants or current or terminated employees; or (4) based on race,
creed, color, sex, age or national origin.4 When Northfield declined to reimburse
Jostens for its legal fees and expenses, Jostens filed a declaratory judgment action.
The district court sustained Northfield's summary judgment motion and Jostens
appealed.
The appellate court summarily disposed of Jostens' reasonable expectations
argument, observing that "Jostens could not have been under more than a
momentary delusion that the policy afforded coverage" given the language and
location of the exclusions." The court turned next to the concept of illusory
coverage. The illusory coverage doctrine, like the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tions, qualifies the general rule that courts construe insurance policies as written."7
In short, the doctrine provides that liability insurance policies should 'be construed
so as not to be a delusion' to the insured.' 48
139. Id. at 676.
140. See id. at 678.
141. Id. at 679.
142. Id. at 678.
143. 527 N.W.2d 116 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
144. Id. at 117.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 118.
147. Id.
148. Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Casualty Co. v. Smith, 76 N.W.2d 486, 490-91 (Minn. 1956)).
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The Jostens court believed that the illusory coverage doctrine is best applied
where part of the premium is specifically allocated to a particular coverage, and that
coverage proves to be "functionally nonexistent."'49 There was no parol evidence
suggesting that Jostens understood that some portion of its premium was allocated
to discrimination coverage. The court therefore construed the policy according to
its plain language, and affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment for
Northfield.'"
2. Public Policy and Insurance for Intentional Acts
Insurers may defend declaratory judgment and bad faith actions by asserting that
public policy forbids coverage for wrongful employment practices in which the
employer's intent to discriminate is a key element. Title VII disparate treatment
claims are perhaps the best example of those claims lending themselves to the
public policy defense. Courts sometimes strain to find disparate impact claims in
disparate treatment cases in order to determine coverage.' Even where intentional
discrimination is the sole issue, courts are sharply divided.
Florida adopted a pro-insurer position in Ranger Insurance Co. v. Bal Harbour
Club.'" Bal Harbour involved a deed restriction that prohibited occupation by
"anyone not a member of the Caucasian race or having more than one-fourth
Hebrew or Syrian blood."'" The restriction further prohibited conveyance of the
property to anyone who was not a member of the Bal Harbour Club. When the
Club refused to admit the prospective purchasers of the restricted property, a Jewish
family named Skolnik, the Skolniks sued. The Skolniks alleged that the Club's
rejection of their application was a willful violation of their rights, and precluded
them from obtaining good and marketable title. The Club tendered the Skolnik's suit
to Ranger, which defended under a reservation of rights. The Club settled the suit
for $25,000, and Ranger then filed a declaratory judgment action."
The trial court entered summary judgment in the Club's favor. The court ordered
Ranger to reimburse the Club for the settlement.' Ranger appealed, and a district
appellate court certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida:
"Does the public policy of Florida prohibit an insured from being indemnified for
a loss resulting from an intentional act of religious discrimination?"' The
supreme court answered affirmatively. '
149. Id. at 119.
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1185 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1033 (1980).
152. 549 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 1989).
153. Id. at 1006.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1005.
157. Id.
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The Bal Harbour court first examined whether the availability of insurance would
stimulate wrongdoers to violate the law.' The club and the lower appellate court
both suggested that making intentional religious discrimination insurable would not
encourage such discrimination. The supreme court believed that their supposition
lacked empirical support and "defie[d] human experience."'5 9
Once a person has insurance, he will take more risks than before
because he bears less of the cost of his conduct . . . .Insurance
therefore tends to increase the likelihood that the insured risks will
come to pass .... If an insurance policy were to cover a city's wilful
racial discrimination, the people making policy for the city would
indulge their own preference for discrimination at little risk to them-
selves. The city would pay in higher rates, but given the insurance each
employee would be more likely to discriminate."
Second, the court examined the purpose served by imposing liability. If
compensating victims is the primary purpose, indemnification may be acceptable.
On the other hand, if deterring wrongdoers is the primary purpose, indemnification
is not a significant consideration. 6' The court concluded that the primary purpose
served by imposing liability for intentional discrimination is deterrence. Because of
intentional discrimination's unique nature, however, the policies of compensation and
deterrence are compatible.'
The Club contended that were intentional discrimination uninsurable, many
discrimination victims would be unable to collect their damage awards." The
court made short work of this argument.
The bulk o discrimination cases are brought against commercial
enterprises that have discriminated in the marketplace or workplace.
These businesses generally have far greater resources than do individu-
als and to hold the acts of such parties uninsurable [will] result in
relatively few instances where the injury [will] go uncompensated. Such
was the case in the present claim.'6"
The Bal Harborur court also rejected the Club's argument that punitive damages
adequately deter intentional discrimination." The court thought the availability
of punitive damages to be insufficiently certain." Moreover, Florida's premier
antidiscrimination statute did not provide for punitive damages, and those statutes
158. Id. at 1007.
159. Id. at 1008.
160. Id. (quoting Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Western World Ins. Co., 769 F.2d 381, 385 (7th
Cir. 1985)).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1009.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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that did provide for punitive damages did so in amounts providing only "a token
wrist slap to a large corporate offender."'"
A California court reached the same conclusion in Colt Drapery Cleaners v.
Sequoia Insurance Co."r The issue in Coit was whether a provision of the
California Insurance Code barring coverage for insured's willful acts, and the
policy's intentional acts exclusion, foreclosed coverage for a sexual harassment
claim.69 The Coit court reasoned that "the public and statutory policy of this state
against sexual harassment ... would not be well served by a ruling [exonerating]
a perpetrator from payment of damages for his own willful act of sexual gratifica-
tion, by shifting such liability to an insurer." '
A number of courts stand at the opposite pole from Bal Harbour and Colt.'
The Sixth Circuit expressly rejected the Bal Harbour court's conclusion in School
District for the City of Royal Oak v. Continental Casualty Co."
Royal Oak involved an elementary school teacher's claim that she was denied
tenure because of her religion. The teacher sued the school district under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. A jury ultimately awarded her compensatory damages of $500,000 (divided
equally between lost wages and emotional distress) and $50,000 in punitive
damages." The case was settled for $250,000 while on appeal. When the school
district's insurer, Continental, refused to pay the settlement, the district sued. The
district court granted the school district's summary judgment motion and Continental
appealed.
Continental argued that even if its policy did not specifically exclude the teacher's
discrimination claim, public policy made the claim uninsurable.74 The Royal Oak
court applied what it called the "stimulation test," focusing on the causal connection
between the wrongful act and the existence of insurance coverage.7 ' Simply
stated, was the wrongful act stimulated by the prospect of indemnification? 76
Applying the stimulation test, the court thought that the school district's liability
for denying tenure should be insurable.
The clash of personalities, culture and values that allegedly led in this
case to the . . . unfavorable tenure recommendation could easily be
duplicated in almost any school district .... Perhaps the existence of
liability insurance might occasionally "stimulate" such a contretemps,
167. ld.
168. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Ct. App. 1993).
169. See id. at 697.
170. Id. at 698.
171. See, e.g., New Madrid County Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. I v. Continental Casualty Co., 904
F.2d 1236, 1242 (8th Cir. 1990) (Missouri law); University of Ill. v. Continental Casualty Co., 599
N.E.2d 1338, 1351 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 606 N.E.2d 1235 (I11. 1992); Independent Sch. Dist.
No. 697 v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 515 N.W.2d 576, 579-80 (Minn. 1994).
172. 912 F.2d 844 (6th Cir.), reh'g denied, 921 F.2d 625 (1990).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 847.
175. Id. at 848.
176. See id.
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but common sense suggests that the prospect of escalating insurance
costs and the trauma of litigation, to say nothing of the risk of
uninsurable panitive damages, would normally neutralize any stimula-
tive tendency that insurance might have.'"
The court further reasoned that public policy favors enforcement of insurance
policies according to their terms.' In the absence of contrary Michigan law on
the insurability of discrimination awards, and given Continental's policy language
apparently affording coverage, the court turned a deaf ear to the insurer's public
policy argument."7 "Had [Continental] wished to exclude coverage for intentional
religious discrimination in employment, it could and should have said so.""'
3. Discrimination as "Personal Injury"
As previously demonstrated, the personal injury coverage available under many
CGL policies often provides the best avenue for an employer seeking defense and
indemnity. United States Fire Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co.' and Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Adams County" are exemplary
cases.
In United States Fire, two women, once employed by United Service Company
(USC), sued their former employer for a variety of wrongs. The plaintiffs alleged
USC should be held liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion
of privacy, breach of contract, assault and battery, and slander." The subject USC
manager allegedly called one of the plaintiffs "a whore and a slut," and referred to
the other as "a 'f-----.g Jew broad.""' USC's insurance policy covered employment
related claims for defamation and invasion of privacy. The policy excluded
coverage for intentional violations of the law 'related to discrimination or unfair
employment practices"' by USC and its directors, officers and shareholders. 5 The
harassing supervisor was not among the excluded categories of USC personnel. The
plaintiffs' complaint did allege, however, that he was USC's agent, and that some
of his discriminatory actions were ratified by others in the USC hierarchy."
The United States Fire court held that USC's liability insurer was obligated to
defend the action. Under the circumstances, the plaintiffs' allegations were
potentially or arguably within coverage. The defamation and invasion of privacy
allegations were covered if it could be established that the underlying actions or
statements were taken or made without discriminatory intent.'87
177. Id.
178. Id. at 849.
179. Id.
180, Id.
181. 511 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986).
182. 534 N.E.2d 1066 (I11. App. Ct. 1989).
183. United States Fire, 511 N.E.2d at 128.
184. Id. at 129.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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The plaintiffs in Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Adams County"' sued the
County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the County violated their constitution-
al rights to due process and equal protection by purposefully assessing their property
in excess of legal limits. The County tendered the matter to its CGL insurer,
Western Casualty, which responded by filing a declaratory judgment action. The
County prevailed at the summary judgment stage and Western Casualty appealed.
The insurer argued, inter alia, that the plaintiffs' complaint did not allege a cause
of action for personal injury as defined in its policies.'89
The policies at issue included the standard CGL definition of an "occurrence."'9
The policies defined "personal injury" as:
(1) bodily injury, sickness, disease, disability or shock, including death
arising therefrom, and, if arising out of the foregoing, mental anguish
and mental injury; (2) false arrest, false imprisonment, wrongful
eviction, wrongful entry, wrongful detention, or malicious prosecution;
or (3) libel, slander, defamation of character, humiliation, or invasion
of the rights of privacy, unless arising out of advertising activities; and
(4) racial or religious discrimination not committed by or at the
direction of the insured or any executive officer, director or stockholder
thereof, but only with respect to the liability other than fines and
penalties imposed by law; caused by an occurrence during the policy
period. 9'
The Adams County court seized on endorsements to the policies excluding
coverage for willful police misconduct."9 The court essentially reasoned that
because the plaintiffs' tax claims were not excluded under the police endorsements,
they must be covered.'93 The court touched on the definition of personal injury
and started into some analysis," but then rushed ahead to conclude that the
plaintiffs' claims were covered.9  The appellate court went so far as to distort a
trial court statement by Western Casualty's counsel to support its coverage
decision."~
Adams County is, quite simply, a terrible decision. The case demonstrates how
far some courts will stretch policy language in order to find potential coverage for
civil rights allegations.Y
188. 534 N.E.2d 1066 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
189. Id. at 1067.
190. Id. at 1068.
191. Id. at 1068-69.
192. See id. at 1069-70.
193. See id. at 1070.
194. See id. at 1069-70.
195. ld. at 1070-71.
196. The insurer's attorney conceded that the policies might conceivably cover some civil rights
claims. See id. at 1070. That sort of concession during argument hardly extrapolates to an admission of
coverage for tax-related § 1983 claims based on intentional conduct, especially given the Adams County
court's unwillingness to explain its personal injury analysis.
197. Gary M. Poplow & Bradley S. McMillan, Employers' Liability Coverage for Disability
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A case at the opposite end of the spectrum from Adams County is Jefferson-Pilot
Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Sunbelt Beer Distributors.' In Jefferson-Pilot,
plaintiff Deana Pressley sued her former employer, Sunbelt, for violating 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 and the Equal Pay Act. Pressley, who Sunbelt once employed as an account
representative, alleged that she was fired for dancing with African American men
at a social gathering following a marketing function."" Sunbelt's CGL insurer,
Jefferson-Pilot, refused to defend or indemnify Sunbelt in connection with Pressley's
suit.
Pressley's complaint sought damages for loss of earnings, loss of benefits, loss
of earning capacity and harm to her reputation. The court quickly concluded that
Pressley's action did not allege property damage, and the court further reasoned
that she suffered nD bodily injury.' The question thus became whether Pressley's
complaint fell within personal injury coverage. The Jefferson-Pilot court concluded
that it did not.
Pressley's complaint did not include a cause of action specifically listed in the
policy definition of personal injury. Sunbelt argued that Pressley's complaint could
be interpreted to fall into the last personal injury category, which provided coverage
"for '[o]ral or written publication of material that violates a person's right of
privacy."" Because Pressley did not plead a cause of action for invasion of
privacy, however, the court concluded that her action was not covered."
4. Discrimination Claims and "Property Damage"
The plaintiffs in Lapeka, Inc. v. Security National Insurance Co.' sued the beer
distributor that laid them off following a consultant's report urging a reduction in
force. The plaintiffs claimed damages for age discrimination, loss of benefits, pain,
embarrassment and humiliation. Lapeka was insured under a CGL policy issued
by Security National. Lapeka tendered the matter to Security National three times;
each time the insurer denied coverage. The plaintiffs eventually recovered more
than $500,000 from Lapeka. Lapeka then demanded that Security National
indemnify it in connection with the plaintiffs' claims. When Security National
refused, Lapeka sued the insurer for the alleged breach of its duties of defense and
indemnity.'
The policy defined "property damage" as "(1) physical injury to or destruction of
tangible property which occurs during the policy period, including the loss of use
Discrimination Under the ADA, BRIEF, Winter 1995, at 22, 26.
198. 839 F. Supp. 376 (D.S.C. 1993).
199. Id. at 378.
200. Id. at 378-79.
201. Id. at 379.
202. Id.
203. Id at 381.
204. Id.
205. 814 F. Supp. 1540 (D. Kan. 1993).
206. Id. at 1543.
207. Id. at 1544.
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thereof. . or (2) loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically
injured or destroyed . . . ."' In other words, the policy employed the standard
CGL policy definition.
Security National contended that none of the plaintiffs in the underlying
discrimination action alleged property damage within the meaning of the policy.
The insurer specifically argued that no tangible property was claimed to have been
damaged. Lapeka countered by pointing out that the plaintiffs alleged that it
breached an implied contract of employment. Lapeka argued that an implied
employment contract constituted tangible property within the meaning of the
Security National policy.'
The Lapeka court concluded that an implied employment contract is not tangible
property for insurance coverage purposes. The court relied in part on the Black's
Law DictionaryP definition of "tangible property" in reaching its conclusion."'
The insured could offer no authority for its urged policy interpretation. The court
held that Security National did not have a duty to defend Lapeka based on the
definition of property damage in its policy."'
The issue in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. First Security Bane 3 was whether
lost wages, diminished earning capacity or damage to reputation constitute "tangible
property" for purposes of property damage coverage." 4 The insured argued that
lost wages and diminished earning capacity represented a loss of money, and that
money is tangible property. Ergo, the underlying suit against the insured for
wrongful termination alleged a loss of tangible personal property."5 The First
Security court concluded that the insured's argument lacked merit.
[A]llegations of loss of wages and diminished earning capacity
constitute intangible property. Wages to be received in the event of
continued employment and an employee's earning capacity constitute
expectations, not entitlements. The suit . . . does not contain any
allegations of an injury to tangible property that produced the conse-
quential damages of lost wages and reduced earning capacity ....
[T]he "property damage" provision of the ... policy does not provide
coverage for [the plaintiffs] allegations of lost wages and diminished
earning capacity."6
208. Id. at 1549.
209. Id.
210. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1456 (6th ed. 1990).
211. Lapeka, 814 F. Supp. at 1549.
212. Id.
213. 662 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Mont. 1987).
214. Id. at 1129.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1129-30.
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Similarly, the plaintiff's allegations that her termination damaged her reputation
concerned intangible property." 7 Absent property damage there was no "occur-
rence," and therefore no liability coverage."8
5. D & 0 Coverage and "Wrongful Acts"
D & 0 policies provide that the insurer shall pay directors' and officers' losses
arising out of claims for alleged wrongful acts. A "wrongful act" is usually defined
as:
[A]ny breach of duty, neglect, error, misstatement, misleading statement,
omission or act by the Directors or Officers of the Company in their
respective capacities as such or any matter claimed against them solely
by reason of their status as Directors or Officers of the Company."9
In order to trigger D & 0 coverage, then, an alleged wrongful employment practice
must constitute a wrongful act within the meaning of the subject policy.
In Golf Course Superintendents Association of America v. Underwriters at
Lloyd's, London, the GCSAA sued Lloyd's to recover under its D & 0 policy
in connection with a civil rights claim. Zahid Iqbal sued the GCSAA for retaliatory
discharge when he was fired after he filed a civil rights action. A jury awarded
Iqbal $50,000 and Lloyd's refused to indemnify the GCSAA for the amount of the
judgment."
The GCSAA and Lloyd's filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The policy
definition of "wrongful act" was critical. The policy defined a "wrongful act" as
'any negligent act, error, omission, misstatement or misleading statement committed
or alleged to have been committed by [GCSAA] or its Directors, Officers,
employees or the members of its committees while in the operation, administration
or management of services provided by [GCSAA].'""
Lloyd's contended that the policy did not cover liability for claims based on
intentional conduct. Of course, in the underlying suit, the GCSAA was found to
have retaliated against Iqbal for his civil rights claim. A retaliatory discharge is
intentional conduc, Lloyd's argued. The district court embraced Lloyd's argu-
ment.m
The policy definition of "wrongful act" included only negligent conduct. The
definition did not include any intentional conduct, such as retaliating against
employees for the exercise of their rights.' The GCSAA argued that the wrongful
act definition was ambiguous, because the term "negligent" in the phrase "negligent
217. Id. at 1130.
218. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs suit did not allege "bodily injury." See id.
219. DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS INSURANCE AND COMPANY REIMBURSEMENT POLICY, NATIONAL
UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITrSBURGH, PA. 2 (Aug. 1988) (on file with the author).
220. 761 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Kan. 1991).
221. Id. at 1486-87.
222. Id. at 1487.
223. Id. at 1489.
224. Id.
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act, error, omission, misstatement or misleading statement" could be interpreted to
only modify the word "act."' If so, intentional errors or omissions would be
covered under the policy.' The court made short work of this argument, believing
that it made better sense to read "negligent" to modify every relevant term in the
definition. It would be self-defeating to limit "wrongful acts" to negligent acts, but
simultaneously cover intentional errors or omissions.'
Beyond the "wrongful act" language, the policy included an endorsement
expressly excluding prior sex discrimination claims from coverage.' The GCSAA
contended that the endorsement excluding coverage for previously filed sex
discrimination claims evidenced the parties' intent to cover prospective discrimina-
tion claims, such as Iqbal's. 9 The court rejected this argument, as well:
First, we note that our construction of the policy does not bar coverage
for all discrimination claims; claims of discriminatory impact, as
opposed to discriminatory treatment, could still be covered ....
Therefore, it is possible for the parties to intend to exclude coverage of
claims for intentional conduct, without intending to exclude coverage of
all future claims of discrimination. Additionally, it is impossible to
ignore the insurance contract's definition of what is covered. The policy
should not be construed only in light of what is expressly excluded from
coverage."
Finally, the GCSAA argued that it could have discharged Iqbal in ignorance of
the law or based on the advice of counsel." The Lloyd's court correctly noted that
this would not make the discharge unintentional. A jury found the GCSAA liable
for intentional misconduct. Iqbal's retaliatory discharge was not a "wrongful act"
covered by the policy at issue. 2
B. Workers' Compensation and Employer's Liability Coverage
The leading case in this area is La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club v. Industrial
Indemnity Co. 3 In La Jolla, Adnan Saleh alleged that he was fired as a restaurant
manager because of his race or nationality. Saleh sued the Club's predecessor,
among others, for breach of an employment agreement, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful termination, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and the violation of the Fair Housing and Employment
Act.' The Club's predecessor tendered defense of Saleh's complaint to Industrial
225. Id. at 1490.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1487.
229. Id. at 1490.
230. Id. (citation omitted).
231. Id. at 1491.
232. Id.
233. 884 P.2d 1048 (Cal. 1994).
234. Id. at 1049-50.
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Indemnity, its workers' compensation and employer's liability insurer. Industrial
refused to defend. The parties ultimately settled and the Club then filed a
declaratory judgment action against Industrial.
Industrial moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had no duty to defend
the Club under either Part 1 (workers' compensation) or Part 2 (employer's liability)
of its policy. The trial court sustained the motion. The Club then appealed, solely
on the ground that Industrial had a duty to defend under the workers' compensation
portion of the policy. 5 A lower appellate court reversed, and Industrial petitioned
the Supreme Court of California for review.
The Club first contended that it reasonably expected that Industrial would defend
it in an employee's civil action alleging claims partially compensable under
California's Workers' Compensation Act. The Club's argument ran counter to the
policy's express language, which provided that Industrial would defend only claims
or suits for benefits payable by workers' compensation insurance." The Supreme
Court rejected the Club's argument, and the Court of Appeal's conclusion, that
Industrial had to expressly exclude civil suits for damages in order to disclaim
coverageftm Moreover, to construe the workers' compensation portion to include
the duty to defend employees' civil suits for damages would render the employer's
liability portion of the policy superfluous. The court reasoned that the parties did
not reasonably expect or intend to effectively read out the employer's liability
coverage.f 8
The Club asserted, however, that they reasonably expected coverage under Part 1
because the policy promised that Industrial would "defend any claim, proceeding or
suit." 9 The La Jolla court succinctly rejected this argument, pointing out the need
to read the entire clause. The policy did not promise to defend any claim or suit;
rather, Industrial promised to defend any claim or suit for benefits payable under
workers' compensation insurance Of course, Saleh's suit did not seek the
payment of workers' compensation benefits.
Alternatively, the Club argued, Industrial had a duty to defend the Saleh suit
because it potentially sought damages covered by the policy. The Club argued that
such potential existed because Saleh's suit provided the opportunity to resolve
essentially all of the conditions precedent to Saleh's receipt of workers' compensa-
235. Id. at 1050.
236. Part I of the policy provided, in pertinent part:
We will pay promptly when due the benefit required of you by the workers compensation
law .... We have the right and duty to defend at our expense any claim, proceeding or
suit against you for benefits payable by this insurance. We have the right to investigate
and settle these claims, proceedings or suits.
We have nc, duty to defend a claim, proceeding or suit that is not covered by this
insurance.
Id. at 1056.
237. 1d.
238. Id.
239. See id. at 1057.
240. Id.
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tion benefits" The Club had to craft this back door argument because it was
clear that regardless of the merits of Saleh's claims, the trial court never had
jurisdiction to award workers' compensation benefits."2 The La Jolla court closed
this back door on the Club by stating that
[no California precedent] suggests that the duty to defend one action is
triggered by the prospect that the insured may face a claim for
materially different relief in some other action brought in a distinctly
different forum, merely because the actions are premised on similar
factual allegations. Indeed, such a rule would render the duty to defend
virtually unlimited. There is always some possibility that facts alleged
in one forum could, in the future, form the basis for a covered claim in
a different action. Were this the test, however, any judicial or adminis-
trative action involving an employer-employee relationship could be
characterized as a "predecessor" claim for workers' compensation
benefits. Workers' compensation insurers would thus be required to
defend employers in criminal prosecutions because the alleged acts may
have resulted in harm to their employees, in Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission investigations because that agency has the
authority to issue "right to sue" letters, and in grand jury proceedings
due to that body's power to recommend the filing of civil actions, which
could then, conceivably, lead to the filing of a workers' compensation
claim. 3
The court made clear that the proper test is whether the underlying action for which
a defense and indemnity are sought potentially seeks relief with the policy's
coverage.'"
Similarly, the court rejected the Club's curious argument that to adopt Industrial's
position would expose employers to the risk that settlements of civil suits will
include the payment of workers' compensation losses.' 5 The court observed that
perhaps some employers might elect to foreclose subsequent workers' compensation
claims by including such claims in other individual settlements. However, such
agreements between employers and employees do not alter the terms of insurance
policies, nor do they create for workers' compensation insurers a duty to defend
civil actions.'
The Club next argued that the court could not reasonably distinguish between
"compensation" (and thus "benefits") and "damages" when determining Industrial's
duty to defend under the policy.241 This argument also failed. First, California
workers' compensation statutes expressly contrast the terms "compensation" and
241. Itt
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1057-58.
244. Id. at 1058.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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"damages." Second, the policy clearly reflected the differences between the two by
providing for workers' compensation "benefits" in Part 1, and employers' civil
liability for "damages" in Part 2.
Finally, the Club asserted that the court's failure to find a duty to defend under
the workers' compensation coverage essentially eviscerated the exclusive remedy
provision of California's workers' compensation scheme.249 The La Jolla court
answered simply: "It does not."' California supreme court precedent made clear
that the workers' compensation and judicial systems are distinct. The court
concluded that Industrial's policy was not ambiguous, and that workers' compensa-
tion insurers have r o duty to defend employees' civil suits for damages."
The Supreme Court of Iowa rejected workers' compensation coverage for sexual
harassment claims in Ottumwa Housing Authority v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. 2 The court observed that under Iowa workers' compensation law, an
employer's immunity 'is the quid pro quo by which [it] gives up [its] normal
defenses and assumes automatic liability,"' while employees give up their rights to
common law verdicts. 3 When the Ottumwa plaintiffs filed their sexual harass-
ment claims in state and federal courts, the quid pro quo for the Housing Authority's
surrender of its normal defenses vanished. The basis for workers' compensation
founded on the same alleged discrimination likewise vanished. Thus, the court
concluded, there could be no workers' compensation coverage.'
C. Conclusion
Many wrongful employment practices suits will trigger insurers' duty to defend.
So long as a plaintiff pleads just one theory that does not include intent as an
element (e.g., disparate impact or negligent infliction of emotional distress), the
insurer probably has to defend the entire suit, even if the policy at issue specifically
excludes other bases for recoveryY5 If a policy is ambiguous with respect to
coverage for wrongful employment practices, basic principles of insurance policy
construction favor insureds. Ambiguities in insurance policies are always resolved
248. Id.
249. See id. at 1059.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. 495 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1993).
253. Id. at 729 (quoting Suckow v. NEOWA FS, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Iowa 1989)).
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Lime Tree Village Community Club Ass'n v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 980 F.2d
1402 (11th Cir. 1993). This is fundamental liability insurance law. See Pennzoil Co. v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 50 F.3d 580, 583-84 (8th Cir. 1995) (interpreting North Dakota law); National
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Glenview Park Dist., 632 N.E.2d 1039, 1042-43 (III. 1994); Employees Ins.
Representatives v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 653 So. 2d 27,29 (La. Ct. App. 1995); White Mountain
Constr. Co. v. Transamrria Ins. Co., 631 A.2d 907, 909-10 (N.H. 1993); Ledford v. Gutoski, 887 P.2d
80, 83 (Or. 1994); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Badger Medical Supply Co., 528 N.W.2d 486, 491 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1995).
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in the insured's favor,' and courts generally construe policies to effect cover-
age.'
Insurers that do not intend to cover wrongful employment practices should
explicitly exclude them? Beyond specific exclusions, insurers should define
"occurrence" and "personal injury" so as to preclude coverage for wrongful
employment practices. Assuming that they appropriately word their policies, the
coverage field tilts decidedly in insurers' favor. Courts are not free to torture policy
language, or to create ambiguities where there are none, in order to resolve policies
against insurers. 9
V. Employment Practices Liability Insurance
A number of large insurers recently began writing Employment Practices Liability
Insurance (EPLI). EPLI is offered either as an endorsement to CGL policies, or as
a separate policy. EPLI coverage varies significantly between insurers. 1
256. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Midgett, 892 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Ark. 1995); Browder
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 893 P.2d 132, 133 (Colo. 1995); Infinity Yachts, Inc. v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 655 So. 2d 1259, 1261-62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Rackouski v. Dobson, 634
N.E.2d 1229, 1231 (I11. App. Ct. 1994); Linder v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 647 N.E.2d 37, 39 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Hopkins Sporting Goods, 522 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Iowa 1994); Arco Indus.
Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 531 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Mich. 1995); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Garriga, 636 So. 2d 658, 662 (Miss. 1994); Katskee v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Neb., 515 N.W.2d 645,
649 (Neb. 1994); Serrett v. Kimber, 874 P.2d 747, 749 (Nev. 1994); Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Mitchell, 637 A.2d 903, 904 (N.H. 1994); Handelsman v. Sea Ins. Co., 647 N.E.2d 1258, 1260 (N.Y.
1994); Wickham v. Equity Fire & Casualty Co., 889 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994); Anderson
v. First Farwest Life Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 999, 1002 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Jennings v. Midville Gold Club,
636 A.2d 707, 708 (R.I. 1994); Diamond State Ins. Co. v. Homestead Indus., 456 S.E.2d 912, 915 (S.C.
1995); Rogers v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 520 N.W.2d 614, 616 (S.D. 1994); Gredig v. Tennessee Farmers
Mut. Ins. Co., 891 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Smith v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
531 N.W.2d 376, 379 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
257. See Arkansas Farm Bureau Ins. Fed'n v. Ryman, 831 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Ark. 1992); Tepe v.
Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Medical Servs., 893 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Yount v.
Maisano, 627 So. 2d 148, 151 (La. 1993); Centermark Properties v. Home Indem. Co., 897 S.W.2d 98,
100-01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Kief Farmers Coop. Elevator Co. v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d
28 (N.D. 1995); General Accident Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Cos., 443 S.E.2d 813, 818 (S.C. Ct. App.
1994).
258. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 697 v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 515 N.W.2d 576, 579
(Minn. 1994); see, e.g., Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assocs., 2 F.3d 105 (5th
Cir. 1993); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259 (Ct. App. 1994).
259. See Heyman Assocs. No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 653 A.2d 122, 130 (Conn. 1995); Sentinel
Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., 875 P.2d 894, 915 (Haw. 1994); Oakley Transp. v. Zurich Ins. Co.,
648 N.E.2d 1099, 1104 (I11. App. Ct. 1995); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259 v. Sloan, 871 P.2d 861, 866
(Kan. Ct. App. 1994); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Powell-Walton-Milward, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 223,
226 (Ky. 1994); Reynolds v. Select Properties, Ltd., 634 So. 2d 1180, 1183 (La. 1994); Hammer v.
Investors Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 511 N.W.2d 6, 8 (Minn. 1994); Jasper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 875 S.W.2d 954,957 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Dalton Buick, Oldsmobile, Pontiac, Cadillac v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 512 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Neb. 1994); Soundview Assocs. v. New Hampshire Ins.
Co., 625 N.Y.S.2d 659, 660 (App. Div. 1995); Still v. Fox, 644 N.E.2d 1133, 1136 (Hamilton County,
Ohio Mun. Ct. 1994); Shadoan v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 894 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994);
Fritz-Pontiac-Cadillac-Buick v. Goforth, 440 S.E.2d 367, 369 (S.C. 1994).
260. Geoffrey L. Isaac & Gina M. Brown, Coverage for Sexual Misdeeds, NAV'L L.J., May 22,
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EPLI policies typically insure the purchasing corporation or entity, as well as its
directors, officers, employees and former employees. Variations between carriers
on who is an insured center on employees and former employees. Some EPLI
policies cover only managerial or supervisory employees, both current and former.
Some insurers do not define an "insured" to include former employees.' 2
EPLI policies generally are written on a claims-made basis.' In other words,
the insured event is the filing of the claim itself, and the claim must be made during
the policy period. A claim may be defined as:
[A] written demand or notice received by the insured in which damages
are alleged. Claim includes a civil action or an administrative proceed-
ing in which damages are alleged or an arbitration proceeding for such
damages to which you must submit or to which you submit with our
consent. Claim shall not include labor or grievance arbitration subject
to a collective bargaining agreement, employment handbook or other
employment policies or procedures.'
EPLI coverage is often provided via "ultimate net loss" or "self-liquidating"
policies, meaning that defense costs are included within coverage limits. Most EPLI
policies cover judgments (including pre- and post-judgment interest), back pay and
statutory attorneys' fees. EPLI policies generally do not insure against fines,
penalties, multiple damages, punitive damages, benefit awards, and nonmonetary
relief.'5
As a general nile, EPLI policies cover discrimination, sexual harassment,
wrongful termination, the failure to employ or promote, and wrongful discipline."
For example, an "insured event" means:
(1) your Employee or former Employee, or an applicant for employment
with you, alleging Discrimination by an insured, or (2) your Employee
or former Employee alleging Sexual Harassment by an insured, or (3)
your former Employee alleging Wrongful Termination by an insured.
Alleging means lodging a complaint or charge with your management
or supervisory Employee(s) or with any government agency or
commencing a civil action.'
1995, at BI 1, B 11; Machson & Monteleone, supra note 9, at 711.
261. ABA Committee Discusses Employment Liability Insurance, Individual Employment Rts. Cases
(BNA), Apr. 11, 1995, at 1, 2.
262. BETrERLEY RISK CONSULTANTS, INC., EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES LIABILITY INSURANCE:
POLICY COMPARISON (1994) [hereinafter BETrERLEY POLICY COMPARISON] (on file with the author).
263. Machson & Monteleone, supra note 9, at 711.
264. EMPLOYMENT RELATED PRACTICES LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY, NEW HAMPSHIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY 6 (1991) (specimen policy on file with the author).
265. BETrERLEY POLICY COMPARISON, supra note 262.
266. Id.
267. EMPLOYMENT RELATED PRACTICES LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY, AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL
SPECIALTY LINES INSUIFANCE COMPANY 6 (Mar. 1993) (specimen policy on file with the author).
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Given the differences between insurers' policies, it is difficult to detail the various
exclusions.' However, it can safely be stated that most policies exclude workers'
compensation liability, contractual liability, bodily injury and property damage
liability, liability imposed under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), and strikes and lockouts. Some EPLI policies also exclude liability for
retaliatory action linked to an employee's refusal to perform an illegal, unlawful or
unethical act, or for retaliatory action against a claimant for her role in an "insured
event.""0
VI. Conclusion
There is nothing to suggest that the current tide of employment litigation will
recede. To the contrary, the proliferation of employment-related statutes and
regulations probably heralds a continuing increase in wrongful employment practices
claims and litigation. As that tide rises, more and more businesses will look to their
insurers for defense and indemnity. The result will be a growing body of insurance
law requiring courts' and practitioners' attention, and increased economic pressures
on liability insurers. How and to what extent Employment Practices Liability
Insurance will effect wrongful employment practices litigation remains to be seen.
268. Machson & Monteleone, supra note 9, at 713.
269. See BETrERLEY POLICY COMPARISON, supra note 262.
270. EMPLOYMENT RELATED PRACTICES LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY, AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL
SPECIALTY LINES INSURANCE COMPANY 2 (1993) (specimen policy, on file with author).
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